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 Abstract 
Issues, such as climate change and global warming, have seen environmental 
protection grow in the global consciousness into something worthy and in need of 
regulation. In response, a number of laws have been enacted which make certain 
environmental actions criminal offences, enforced through the criminal justice 
system. These environmental crimes are enforced using the same mechanisms and 
must satisfy the same procedural safeguards as „traditional‟ criminal offences in order 
to secure conviction. This discussion looks at elements of the current system and 
whether it provides an effective system for protecting the environment. An 
examination of the alternatives is also made to establish if different enforcement 
mechanisms would facilitate better environmental regulation.       
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Introduction 
In the context of legal regulation environmental law is „basically „virgin law‟‟2  as 
previously environmental protection „was not generally a priority for law-makers and 
the courts.‟3 An even more recent development in environmental regulation has been 
the criminalisation of environmental wrongs,4 through the creation of specific 
environmental crimes, allowing the weight of the criminal justice system to be used to 
protect the environment. This article examines the issues surrounding criminal 
environmental regulation and whether a solution to the perceived problems could be 
found in an alternative enforcement mechanism.   
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Environmental crime has been described as a „growing social evil‟,5 with „harm to 
ecological and/or biological systems [for] …business or personal advantage‟6 as well 
as „abandoned shopping trolleys and noise nuisance‟7 falling within its remit. This 
potentially wide application means that there is no coherent definition, with both 
direct and indirect acts under „the umbrella of environmental crime‟8 causing 
application problems for a system which ultimately relies on certainty as an 
underlying requirement. 
 
Criminal law sets its own rules, carries with it a social stigma and is described as a 
„method of social control [and] a framework specifying the parameters of acceptable 
behaviour.‟9 However, environmental crimes do not overtly threaten social stability in 
the same way as other crimes, but arguably threaten the „survival of society itself.‟10 
Environmental crimes also have two victims, the individual (including their property), 
as with other crimes, and the environment,11 which may be said to involve „common 
property.‟ This unique nature challenges many of the traditional concepts of criminal 
law and its accepted norms. 
 
In recent years a number of reports have looked at the issues surrounding 
environmental crime. The Hampton Report12 and Macrory Review13 both examined 
the sanctioning powers while the Environmental Audit Committee conducted a review 
into Environmental Crime and the Courts.14 They both reported problems with 
criminal environmental regulation including the range, level and appropriateness of 
the sentences, the reliance on criminal sanctions when they are not always 
appropriate and the lack of deterrent.15 The impact of these problems will be 
examined to determine the relative success or otherwise of current environmental 
regulation.  
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1 Prosecuting Environmental Crime 
The Environment Agency‟s stated aims for prosecutions are „to punish wrongdoing, 
to avoid a recurrence and to act as a deterrent to others.‟16 However, with 
environmental crimes being committed by a „diverse range of individuals and 
corporate bodies‟17 it is argued that these aims are not being met. The criminal legal 
framework, when dealing with traditional crimes, generally only deals with individuals 
and will rarely, if ever, deal with companies. Therefore, when individuals commit 
environmental crimes criminal law has the mechanisms to deal with them: however, 
„whilst many environmental crimes are caused by lazy, negligent or malicious 
individuals, some of the worst instances of such crimes are the responsibility of 
companies.‟18 This can make the imposition of liability problematic.  
 
Due to company structures and the responsibilities held at each level, it is difficult to 
identify those responsible from behind the corporate structure. Companies frequently 
also seek to blame third parties or categorise harm as an „unavoidable accident‟19 in 
an attempt to „capitalise on the relative absence of conceptualisations of collective 
fault in our law‟20 Despite this, there has been some success with corporate liability. 
In Express Ltd v Environment Agency [2005]21 the convictions of both the licensee 
and the company owner were upheld when cream, spilt by the licensee, entered 
controlled waters.22  
 
Some environmental offences apply directly to companies although many will be 
committed by employees from which liability will ensue vicariously. Previously, 
companies could only be prosecuted if an employee was „of sufficient seniority to act 
as the „controlling mind‟ of the company.‟23 This, however, defeated the statutory 
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purpose of these offences and so companies can now be liable for all employees,24 
not only because of their „capacity to educate and control‟25 but also because:  
 
to make [an] offence an effective weapon in the defence of environmental 
protection a company must by necessary implication be criminally liable 
for the acts or omissions of its servants or agents during activities being 
done for the company.26 
 
In NRA v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd [1994]27 the company were acquitted at 
first instance for causing water pollution on the grounds that the employees who 
caused the incident were not of sufficiently high seniority.28 On appeal, however, they 
were found liable as Morland J held that the purpose of the Water Resources Act 
1991 was to prevent water pollution and this could only be achieved if, by implication, 
the company were liable for all employees.29 Other provisions, such as section 217 
Water Resources Act 1991,30 provide that a „director, manager, secretary, or other 
similar officer of a corporate body‟ can be prosecuted for an environmental offence 
where they consented, participated or caused the offence by their negligence. A 
successful conviction was brought under section 217(3) in Express Ltd v 
Environment Agency [2005]31 although such convictions are rare.  
 
Private Prosecutions  
As a principle of English Law, „every citizen still has the right …to invoke the aid of 
courts of criminal jurisdiction for the enforcement of the criminal law.‟32 The right to 
bring a private prosecution, including for environmental offences, is upheld by section 
6(1) Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, save where Parliament has expressly 
excluded it, such as under section 216 Water Resources Act 1991,33 although there 
are often „significant hurdles‟ to overcome which ensures „that all but the most 
committed will be deterred from having recourse to the criminal courts.‟ 34 
                                            
24
 Ibid. 
25
 de Prez, „Excuses, Excuses: The Ritual Trivialisation of Environmental Prosecution,‟ p.69. 
26
 National Rivers Authority (Southern Region) v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd [1994] 
Env.LR. 198 per Morland J at pp.211-212. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Bell  and McGillivray, Environmental Law, p.265. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Also see s.157 Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
31
 Express Ltd (t/a Express Dairies Distribution) v Environment Agency [2005] Env.LR 7. 
32
 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers and Others Respondents [1977] 3 WLR 300, [1978] 
AC 435, per Lord Diplock at pp.497-498. 
33
 It provides that a prosecution can only be brought by the Environment Agency or with the 
consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP). 
34
 Parpworth, N., „Enforcing Environmental Laws: The Role of the Private Prosecution,‟ (2007) 
Journal of Planning and Environmental Law pp.331-2. 
Plymouth Law Review (2009) 1 
5 
 
 
This does not mean that private prosecutions are never brought.35 In R v Anglian 
Water Services Ltd [2004] a successful private prosecution was brought for gross 
water pollution which resulted in a £200,000 fine (reduced to £60,000 on appeal).36 
Pressure groups, such as Greenpeace who brought the first private prosecution 
under the Water Act 1989, in Greenpeace v Albright and Wilson [1991], have also 
brought successful private prosecutions. The threat of private prosecution can also 
be enough, as happened following the „running aground of the Sea Empress off the 
coast of Milford Haven.‟ 37 The Campaign Director at Friends of the Earth said:  
 
If justice is to be done, then we must have proper enforcement of 
environmental law. The public has waited patiently …but still the 
Environment Agency won‟t say who is to blame. We are putting them on 
notice that if they won‟t prosecute, then Friends of the Earth will.38 
 
This resulted in a prosecution by the Environment Agency.39 However, while private 
prosecutions can play a major role in highlighting environmental issues they are the 
„exception rather than the rule.‟40 
 
Private prosecutions also partly underpin the aims of the Aarhus Convention,41 to 
which the UK is a signatory. Based on Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration,42 the 
Convention provides, as one of the three pillars of participation in environmental 
matters, that there should be access to justice in environmental matters.43 Under 
Article 9(2):  
Each Party shall, within the framework of its national legislation, ensure that 
members of the public concerned: 
(a) Having a sufficient interest, or, alternatively, 
(b) Maintaining impairment of a right, where the administrative procedural law 
of a Party requires this as a precondition, 
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have access to a review procedure before a court of law and/or another 
independent and impartial body established by law, to challenge the 
substantive and procedural legality of any decision, act or omission.‟44 
 
These provisions „should provide adequate and effective remedies…and be fair, 
equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.‟45 However, while provisions are 
provided at law, the problems surrounding private prosecutions means the 
Convention is mainly upheld at face value.   
 
Being part of the European Community (EC) has also impacted on environmental 
protection.46 While the European Treaty provides that Member States have an 
automatic right to challenge Community measures47 the rights of third parties are 
restricted as „traditionally citizens‟ suits…have not been recognised in the European 
Community legal order.‟48 Article 230/EC allows third parties to make a challenge if 
the matter is „of direct and individual concern.‟49 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
has, however, taken a restrictive interpretation of this, requiring the applicant to prove 
that their legal right is affected in a way that is different from all others. In an 
environmental context:  
this has led to the perverse consequence that the wider and more 
extensive the environmental implications of a Community measure, the 
more difficult it is for any individual third party to challenge its legality 
directly before the ECJ.50     
 
Greenpeace and Others v European Commission (1998)51 concerned a challenge to 
the construction of two coal-fired power plants in the Canary Islands. The Court of 
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First Instance (CFI) said that none of the applicants had standing as they were not 
directly concerned, despite one of them living next to the plant. On appeal, this was 
upheld, saying they were „part of a general class, so not individually concerned.‟52 
This arguably has the effect of excluding everyone „because where the environment 
is concerned there will not be circumstances in which one group of individuals or 
NGOs could be said to be more individually affected.‟53 The case of Região 
Autónoma dos Açores v Council of the European Union [2008]54 saw a challenge by 
the Azores Government against the EC Fisheries Regulation rejected by the ECJ 
because of insufficient standing demonstrating the „ECJ‟s strict approach to standing 
requirements for parties who wish to directly challenge the legality of Community law 
and actions‟.55 
 
The EC are also signatories to the Aarhus Convention56 which creates the obligation 
to provide access to environmental justice. In WWF-UK Ltd v Council of the 
European Union (2008)57 the WWF sought to challenge the decision on the allocation 
of cod stocks in the North Sea. The CFI said the case was inadmissible as the WWF 
had no standing and „the Aarhus Convention does not change the situation . . . 
because “any entitlements which [the WWF] may derive from the Aarhus Convention 
and [the implementing Regulation] are granted to it as a member of the public”‟58 
giving them no individuality.   
 
It was also argued in Região Autónoma dos Açores v Council of the European Union 
[2008] that a new approach to standing was required because of the Aarhus 
Convention. However, this argument fell on „deaf ears.‟59 The ECJ relied on Article 
9(3) which, while granting a right to access, makes it conditional to „where [the 
                                            
52
 Sands, „Rethinking Environmental Rights,‟ p.119. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Região Autónoma dos Açores v Council of the European Union [2008] 3 CMLR 30 (Case T-
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applicants] meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its national law.‟60 As such the case 
noted that there is access to the ECJ providing the conditions of „direct and individual 
concern‟61 test are met. The court also expressly stated that for this to change 
Member States would have to amend the Treaty. However, they seem unwilling to do 
so with Article 264 of the Lisbon Treaty simply reiterating the „direct and individual 
concern‟ test.62  
 
2 Strict Liability 
Environmental protection in the UK relies heavily on strict liability offences63 whereby 
the „prosecution are relieved of the necessity of proving mens rea [the guilty mind] in 
relation to one or more elements of the actus reus.‟64 The archetypal strict liability 
environmental offence is section 85(1) Water Resources Act 1991 which makes it an 
offence to „cause …any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter or any waste matter to 
enter any controlled waters.‟65 In assessing the nature of liability under this section 
Lord Hoffman, in Environment Agency v Empress Car Co. Ltd [1999], stated: 
 
It is immediately clear that the liability imposed by the subsection is strict: 
it does not require mens rea in the sense of intention or negligence. Strict 
liability is imposed in the interests of protecting controlled waters from 
pollution66  
 
The classic application of this was in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972]67 where a 
company manufacturing paper appealed against their conviction under section 2(1) 
Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951.68 The basis of the appeal was that there 
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64
 Clarkson, C., et al., Clarkson and Keating Criminal Law: Text and Materials, (2007, 
Thomson) p.206.   
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had been no knowledge or negligence on their part but the conviction was upheld 
and the House of Lords confirmed that the offence was one of strict liability.69  In R v 
Milford Haven Port Authority [2000] it was said that Parliament creates offences of 
strict liability:  
 
because it regards the doing or not doing of a particular thing as itself so 
undesirable as to merit the imposition of criminal punishment on anyone 
…irrespective of that party's knowledge, state of mind, belief or intention. 
This involves a departure from the prevailing canons of the criminal law 
because of the importance which is attached to achieving the result which 
Parliament seeks to achieve.70 
 
Environmental offences, it is argued, attract strict liability because the danger they 
pose is „so potentially devastating, so far-reaching and so costly to rectify‟71 that 
criminal liability is imposed in the absence of blameworthiness to ensure that 
everything possible is done to prevent environmental harm.72 However, there is no 
clear relationship between strict liability and the seriousness of the offence as „both 
triviality and gravity have been used as an argument in favour of strict liability.‟73 For 
trivial offences, strict liability is justified by the lack of stigma warranting no court time 
or expenditure being wasted in an attempt to prove fault.74 Conversely, the 
seriousness of an offence also justifies strict liability as a prevention mechanism.    
Abbot has observed that environmental harm can be:  
 
catastrophic, extend across geographical boundaries and potentially affect 
future generations, thereby making remediation …difficult, costly and maybe 
even impossible, means criminal environment offences need to be defined in 
terms of the risks they create, not simply in terms of the immediate harm they 
cause75 
 
These consequences thus show the potential seriousness of environmental harm. 
Strict liability offences, therefore, arguably seek to deter environmental criminals and 
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 Alphacell Ltd v Woodward 824. 
70
 R v Milford Haven Port Authority (The Sea Empress) [2000] Env.LR. 632 per Lord Bingham 
at p.644 
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 Ibid.  
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reflect the polluter pays principle.76 Strict liability is also seen as „efficient‟77 with the 
relative ease of securing conviction being an immediate advantage. As has been 
judicially observed, if the prosecution had:  
 
the often impossible onus of proving that the pollution was caused 
intentionally or negligently, a great deal of pollution would go unpunished 
and undeterred…78 
 
The relative simplicity of proving strict liability offences has the potential to bolster 
compliance and act as a deterrent. Such offences also facilitate criminalising the 
behaviour of corporate offenders, where „mens rea offences pose a more conceptual 
challenge.‟79 In this sense, strict liability offences are „efficient‟ as the evidence of an 
environmental breach is usually behind the company boundary, under their exclusive 
control, and not easily accessible to the regulator.80  
 
The „one size fits all approach,‟81 however, equates an unintentional breach with a 
deliberate act meaning even exemplary behaviour can result in criminal conviction, 
as in CPC (UK) Ltd v NRA [1995],82 because there is „no necessary correspondence 
between a criminal conviction and any morally blameworthy conduct.‟83 It also 
arguably reduces the impact of the criminal law. If those who are not morally 
blameworthy are liable, the social stigma is weakened. For this reason many have 
argued it is inappropriate to punish defendants who lack mens rea84 as: 
 
„using the criminal law entails particular procedural safeguards and 
outcomes which can seem inappropriate and heavy handed where the 
harm caused is perhaps not truly „criminal‟ in intent.‟85  
                                            
76
 Bell and McGillivray, Environmental Law, p.260; „the polluter should bear the expenses of 
carrying out …pollution prevention and control measures…to ensure that the environment is 
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82
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83
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This is especially true for environmental offences, where prosecutions are meant to 
be a last resort. It is, therefore, suggested that those who are not blameworthy 
should be dealt with by alternative mechanisms; the criminal courts only being used 
for those who are blameworthy. Such prosecutions would fit into the rigid criminal law 
structure and could be dealt with by the norms of criminal enforcement.  Strict liability 
does, however, allow environmental enforcement to be carried out against a 
„backdrop of criminal law and the implied threat of invocation.‟86 Macrory has argued 
that: 
„without the existence of criminal offences which are reasonably easy to 
prove, the regulator‟s power to advise and warn…would be seriously 
jeopardised.‟87   
 
Thus such offences underpin environmental enforcement to ensure a sufficient threat 
of prosecution and to achieve compliance in a wider context. However, the 
implications, especially in criminalising behaviour that is not blameworthy, can be 
seen in the mitigating factors and defences advanced to avoid liability.  
 
Defences 
The severity of imposing liability where it is not substantiated with the relevant mens 
rea is mitigated as culpability is considered when deciding whether to prosecute and 
in sentencing,88 despite it not being expressly required. The presence of fault is 
highly influential in enforcement bodies‟ decision to prosecute and has meant they 
are reluctant to prosecute difficult cases.89 The public mindset of associating criminal 
conviction with blameworthiness also influences the decision to prosecute. However, 
if prosecutions are only brought when there is culpable behaviour, the underpinning 
ideals of strict liability are arguably being ignored. Their aim is to facilitate both a 
wider public interest goal and environmental protection, but this is being diminished 
by the enforcement agencies‟ belief in the need to adhere to the procedural structure 
of criminal enforcement and factor in the culpability of the defendant in order to 
legitimise their prosecution. 
 
                                            
86
 Macrory, R., Regulatory Justice: Sanctioning in the Post-Hampton World, A Consultation 
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A number of statutory defences are also available including acting in accordance with 
consent90 or in an emergency.91 Other defences include due diligence and having a 
reasonable excuse.92 In practice, however, these are construed very narrowly „in 
order to protect the underlying aims of environmental legislation.‟93 This was 
illustrated in Durham County Council v Peter Connors Industrial Services Ltd. 
[1993]94 where the court said reasonable care was not the same as due diligence, as 
this would negate the strictness of liability. As well as the availability of defences, it 
has also been observed that:    
„strict liability acts as a cloak for many defendants, for as the prosecution 
is not required to prove „fault‟ this leaves the defence counsel plenty of 
room to deny culpability in order to attract the sympathy of the bench.‟95  
 
Defendants often try to invoke sympathy by claiming it was an accident or blaming a 
third party. In previous water pollution cases96 many defendants were found not guilty 
due to acts of a third party. However, in overturning this line of authority, and 
returning to the strict Alphacell Ltd v Woodward stance, the House of Lords in 
Environment Agency v Empress Car Co. Ltd [1999] held that only „extraordinary‟ 
occurrences would relieve a defendant of liability.97  
 
While there seems to be a shift away from allowing mitigation and defences, there is 
still „routine trivialisation of environmental offences‟98 in the lower courts, through the 
lack of understanding of environmental issues. Such trivialisation is arguably „most 
detrimental to the ideological role of the criminal prosecution‟99 and is seriously 
impeding efforts to protect the environment.  
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Social Stigma 
Judicial attitudes to environmental matters reinforce the social view that 
environmental offences are not truly criminal and not deserving of condemnation.100 
In Alphacell Ltd v Woodward Lord Salmon supported the view that the strict liability 
offences under the Water Resources Act 1991 'are not criminal in any real sense, but 
are acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty.'101 This attitude 
reflects „the paradox of strict liability‟ according to Benson: thus „the law is seeking to 
impose criminal penalties for actions which, even the most senior judges have 
acknowledged, are not properly regarded as criminal.‟102  
 
There has been a subsequent departure from Lord Salmon‟s comments, with some 
judges openly denying the „non-criminal‟103 stance. However, more is needed to 
change attitudes than judges distancing themselves from previous comments: rather, 
a conscious move to demonstrate the application of criminal law in an environmental 
context in the manner it was intended it to be used. The weakening of the stigma 
attached to criminal convictions has also led to the distinction between criminal and 
civil law being blurred.104 While the main justification for imposing criminal penalties 
for environmental offences is public protection, it is the public themselves, ably 
assisted by the judiciary, who are undermining environmental protection.   
   
Alternatives 
In response to the criticisms, suggestions have been advanced to change 
environmental enforcement practices. While it has been argued that it would be more 
difficult to secure a conviction in the absence of strict liability, many believe fault 
based liability would raise the status of environmental offences.105 Macrory suggests 
that strict liability should be the basis for environmental offences. However, to 
address the lack of mens rea, he suggests that „where there is no deliberate or 
reckless or repeated flouting of the law‟ a more appropriate course of action would be 
a Monetary Administrative Penalty. This would allow the regulator to impose a fixed 
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or variable monetary penalty in place of criminal conviction, similar to the „hybrid‟ 
models used in Germany and the USA.106 
 
Alternatively, Benson suggest that environmental offences should depend on proof of 
negligence. In this sense negligence would mean „an objective failure to observe the 
environmental protection standards and practices that would generally be regarded 
as reasonable.‟ A model for negligence based liability is found in the waste 
management offences in section 33(1) Environmental Protection Act 1990.107 The 
prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant deposited 
„controlled waste, or knowingly cause[d] or knowingly permit[ed] controlled waste to 
be deposited in or on any land.‟108 However, under section 33(7), it is a defence, on a 
balance of probabilities, if the defendant „took all reasonable precautions and 
exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.‟ This situation 
could be equally applied to other environmental offences.  
 
While it has been suggested that this would increase the burden of proof, in practice, 
it would not cause significant problems. With the current discretionary enforcement 
policy requiring an „evidential test and relevant public interest factors„109 to be taken 
into account, proving negligence would not exclude many cases from being 
effectively prosecuted.110 Some jurisdictions, such as Germany and Austria, do not 
have a concept of strict liability111 thereby suggesting that environmental protection 
could be set against a backdrop of fault based liability.     
 
3 Sentencing 
For the majority of environmental crimes the starting point for sentencing is usually a 
fine and for the most serious offences, a custodial sentence, although the latter are 
rarely imposed. It is also a constant theme of environmental crimes that the likelihood 
of being caught is slim and in the relatively few cases prosecuted, the sentences 
imposed are seldom satisfactory112. Given the breadth of environmental offences and 
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their unique nature, the restricted choice of substantive sentences is seen, by many, 
as a major barrier to effective environmental regulation.113 
 
Fines 
Given that „for the vast majority of current environmental crimes, the only option open 
to a court [is] to fine,‟114 suggests a need to consider the adequacy of their level. 
Benson argues that they are inadequate, leading to the view that environmental 
crime „pays.‟ While this presumes that the motivation behind the offences is financial, 
this is not always the case. However, to the extent that such crimes are financially 
motivated, the fines imposed should reflect this and take into account any profit made 
by breaking the law.115 Despite this, the financial aspects of the defendant‟s crime 
„form too little a part in the decision as to the size of the fine or sentence.‟116 Even 
with an increased maximum sentence of £20,000 available in the magistrates‟ court, 
and some exceptional upper limits of £50,000 and £250,000,117 the fines imposed 
rarely exceed £5,000 and are often much less. Similarly, Crown Court fines can be 
unlimited, but rarely top £10,000.118 If the fines do not bear some correlation to the 
financial incentives and the offender is not required to pay substantially more than 
they have gained, there will no deterrent in the sentence imposed119.  
 
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 allows the Crown Court to make an order to recover 
profit gained from criminal offences.120 This can equally be applied to environmental 
offences although as over 90%121 of environmental cases are heard in the 
magistrates‟ court, this provision will not be available in the majority of cases. The 
problem with sentencing environmental crimes is that often the offence charged is 
just the „tip of the iceberg‟122 in relation to the criminal activity undertaken, but the law 
cannot deal with offences in a wider context. A typical example is where a defendant 
carries out an operation without the necessary licence and the fine imposed reflects 
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the cost of that licence for one year even though the offence many have been 
ongoing for many years.123 This „snapshot in time‟124 approach is not conducive to 
accurately reflecting the harm caused or the benefit gained.  
 
In Environment Agency v Milford Haven Port Authority (The Sea Empress) the Court 
of Appeal reduced a fine of £4 million following the spillage of 72,000 tons of crude 
oil, damaging 38 Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), to £750,000. The clean-
up cost, however, was estimated at between £49 and £50 million.125 The fine, 
therefore, went no way to reflecting the harm caused or the cost of rectifying it. The 
disparity between fines and the actual costs involved also arguably plays into the 
hands of unscrupulous businesses who view fine payments as a compliance option 
„and even set aside funds for this purpose.‟126 Hampton gives the example of a waste 
company who failed to register for a waste disposal licence for two years and were 
fined £25,000, despite making a saving of £250,000. Removing a company‟s ability 
for economic gain from environmental crimes is essential to ensure a level playing 
field in business, yet, in the current system, a company is working to its economic 
advantage and is one step ahead of its competitors by breaking the law.127 The use 
of fines for environmental offences favours the offender to the extent that they are 
almost detrimental to the environment. The fines do not act as a deterrent but rather 
encourage and promote non-compliance as the cheaper option. This is especially 
problematic given the fact that fines are the main sanctioning tool.   
 
Custodial Sentences 
Although fines make up the bulk of environmental sentences, they are by no means 
the only sentencing option available. As with other criminal offences, substantive 
environmental offences also carry the possibility of custodial sentences. The 
magistrates‟ court has the power to impose a custodial sentence for a maximum of 6 
months for a single offence and 12 months in aggregate.128 The Crown Court 
maximum is 2 years, although certain offences carry a higher maximum.129   
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The courts‟ approach to imposing custodial sentences was considered in R v O'Brien 
and Enkel [2000]. The defendants unlawfully disposed of 2,000 lorry tyres and, 
following conviction, they were sentenced to eight months imprisonment. They 
appealed on the grounds that this was inappropriate and the appeal was upheld on 
the basis that the offence did not warrant a custodial sentence as it did „not pass the 
custody threshold.‟130 The Court of Appeal, in their judgment, set out the factors to be 
taken into account when imposing a custodial sentence. These include where the 
offences committed are  
repeated and/or blatant and/or committed by companies and/or expose the 
public to hazardous substances, for example explosives, acids and so on 
and/or committed in a public location.131  
 
This ensures that custodial sentences are imposed in only the most serious cases. 
 
The defendant in R v Tapscott [2007] was convicted of three counts of depositing 
controlled waste, without a waste management licence.132 When imposing a 
sentence of 16 months imprisonment, the judge referred to the aggravating factors in 
the Sentencing Advisory Panel‟s advice on environmental crime and stated that a 
custodial sentence was appropriate given the „the serious nature of these offences, 
aggravated as they were by the applicant's total disregard for the law and other 
people‟.133 The judge also used section 147 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) 
Act 2000134 to disqualify the defendant from driving for two years While this was 
reduced on appeal to one year‟s disqualification it illustrates that fines and custodial 
sentences are not the only available sentences, and in this instance, disqualification 
from driving may be a more practical means of preventing the defendant from 
reoffending.      
  
In R v Kelleher [2008] the defendant appealed against his 14 month custodial 
sentence for conspiracy to deposit controlled waste contrary to section 33 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 following, during an 18 month period, a „wide 
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scale operation [to] unlawfully deposit controlled waste material.‟135 His co-accused 
was sentenced to 22 months imprisonment, the maximum available at the time being 
2 years.136 At first instance the judge felt that imprisonment was necessary for what 
he described as „such flagrant, eyes open wrongdoing.‟137 In considering the appeal 
the court noted there were very „few sentencing examples available to Crown Court 
Judges who are called upon to sentence‟138 such cases, although they did make 
reference to Tapscott and O'Brien and Enkel.  
 
The court stated that a „custodial sentence may be appropriate if (as here) the breach 
or breaches concerned were deliberate, repeated, large scale, highly organised, 
financially motivated and highly profitable or combined any of these features.‟139 The 
appeal was, therefore, dismissed as it was a „very serious case of its type.‟140   
 
Despite the ability to impose custodial sentences, the courts generally only use them 
in exceptional circumstances and they account for, on average, 1.2% of 
environmental sentences imposed in England and Wales.141 The negligible use of 
custodial sentences focuses the attention back on other sentencing methods such as 
community sentences, which are also scarcely used, accounting for less than 10% of 
all sentences,142 or fines, which are not adequate in achieving the aims of 
environmental protection.  
 
Sentencing Guidelines 
Many have suggested that the solution to sentencing problems may be the 
availability of effective guidelines. With the vast majority of environmental offences 
heard in the lower courts, there is not enough authority in the decisions to create any 
meaningful precedent.143 Sentences therefore vary greatly and lead to the 
inconsistent consideration of different factors. Despite this, the Court of Appeal has 
refused to issue guidance on environmental sentencing. 
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In 1999 the Sentencing Advisory Panel issued proposals to the Court of Appeal upon 
which sentencing guidelines for environmental offences could be framed. However, 
in R v Milford Haven Port Authority the Court of Appeal refused to produce formal 
guidelines deciding that each case should be decided on its own facts, saying „we do 
not conclude that we can usefully do more than draw attention to the factors relevant 
to sentence.‟144 In coming to their decision, the court made reference to five cases, 
four of which involved health and safety offences that had resulted in many deaths, to 
give them assistance. They concluded that the cases turned  
 
very much on their own facts and circumstances. None of them provides 
anything approaching an exact analogy. They do not in our judgment 
enable us to indicate an appropriate level of fine in such cases as the 
present.‟145  
 
The Court of Appeal, instead, had regard to the guidelines, they had themselves set, 
in R v F. Howe & Son (Engineers) Ltd [1999].146 The opportunity to formalise 
environmental sentencing guidelines was missed. Instead, the Court of Appeal chose 
to borrow guidelines applicable to health and safety offences, where liability is not 
strict and the outcomes are often very different to environmental harm, which have a 
very limited scope in an environmental context.147  
 
R v Anglian Water Services Ltd [2004] concerned the discharge of pollutants into a 
river which resulted in a £200,000 fine being reduced to £60,000 on appeal. The 
Court of Appeal were invited by the Environment Agency to suggest a tariff for 
sentences, based on that adopted by the Agency for prosecutions. They declined 
and reaffirmed that each case should be decided on its own facts, as no two cases 
are the same.148   
 
In R v Cemex Cement Ltd [2008], again, the Court of Appeal reduced a fine imposed 
by the Crown Court. The company had been fined £400,000 for committing an 
offence contrary to reg.32(1)(b) Pollution Prevention and Control (England and 
Wales) Regulations 2000, which was reduced to £50,000.149 It is suggested that such 
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a significant reduction is of considerable concern either because the Court of Appeal 
are too lenient or more worryingly because the Crown Court cannot impose adequate 
sentences.150 The gulf in opinion between the two as to appropriate sentences clearly 
suggests the need for guidance to remove the inconsistencies and uncertainties, 
which have no place in criminal law.   
 
Despite the situation in the higher courts, there has been guidance issued for the 
magistrates‟ court. In 2001 the Magistrates‟ Association issued Fining of Companies 
for Environmental and Health and Safety Offences151 which the Court of Appeal in 
Anglian Water Services Ltd said contained „helpful advice, which we endorse.‟152 In 
2003 they also issued Costing the Earth: Guidance for Sentencers153 with the aim of 
assisting magistrates by ensuring they have the necessary tools to make the criminal 
justice system work effectively in sentencing environmental crimes.154 However, while 
this guidance has been of some use, it does not cover all offences or apply to the 
Crown Court and so its effect is limited.  
 
4 Alternatives and Reforms 
Over-reliance on the criminal law is not without consequence according to 
commentators who have considered its procedural rigidity.155 An alternative 
regulatory system may, however, bring environmental crimes into line with the 
objectives of environmental protection. Despite extensive criticism of the „heavy 
reliance on criminal sanctions as a formal response to regulatory non-compliance,‟156 
regulatory systems do not have to depend on criminal sanctions to be effective157. 
The Environment Agency already has at its disposal more draconian penalties158 
outside the criminal justice system. Environmental regulation largely operates on a 
licensing system, whereby a licence is needed to carry out certain, potentially 
harmful, environmental activities. This system is now governed largely by 
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overarching rules,159 set out in the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2007,160 which provide a standardised process for obtaining a licence 
and a common set of enforcement powers.161 
 
The Environment Agency has the power to vary, suspend or revoke licences, the 
effect being to deprive businesses or individuals of the ability to continue their 
operations within the law.162 This is potentially a very powerful sanction, as while 
many companies see fines as „little more than operational costs,‟ they are „unlikely to 
regard the prospect of corporate incapacitation with equanimity.‟163  Administrative 
sanctions are at the top of the „enforcement pyramid,‟164 being seen as more serious 
than criminal sentences, especially for companies, where the suspension or 
revocation of a licence is the most serious sanction available, seen as equivalent to a 
custodial sentence imposed on an individual. In practice, however, administrative 
powers of this nature are rarely used with only six waste management licences 
revoked between 1996 and 2001 despite hundreds of prosecutions every year.165 
This unwillingness is put down to the lengthy and costly appeals although this 
ultimately negates the deterrent they pose. 
 
Civil Penalties 
Civil penalties, as „discretionary monetary sum[s] …imposed flexibly under the civil 
law rather than the criminal law, in order to achieve deterrence and reparation,‟166 
have also been suggested as an alternative. This would allow environmental 
enforcement without the „moral “baggage” associated with criminal prosecutions.‟167   
The use of civil penalties for environmental offences is a prevalent feature of many 
European countries, as well as Australia.168 In Germany, civil penalties or 
„Ordnungswidrigkeiten‟ handle minor offences as the „35,000 environmental offences 
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were apparently “clogging up” the system.‟169 The main sanctions used are 
„Geldbuße,‟ whereby the maximum penalty is €500,000170 and are described as „the 
most coherent and comprehensive system of regulatory enforcement.‟171 Australia, a 
common law jurisdiction, also uses civil penalties, carrying a maximum AUS$550,000 
for an individual and AUS$5.5 million for companies.172  
 
The Environment Agency have suggested that civil penalties „would provide a useful 
additional tool for dealing with non-intentional and less serious offending‟ although 
they would like to reserve the right to use criminal prosecutions when appropriate.173 
This would allow a fairer distinction to be made174 between intentional offenders, who 
could still be prosecuted through the criminal law, and those who unintentionally 
commit an environmental crime, who, if appropriate, could receive a civil penalty. It is 
hoped that this „will recriminalize the criminal law, so that it‟s used effectively as the 
ultimate sanction against real environmental criminals.‟175 This would allow 
environmental crimes to be dealt with in the appropriate manner as „what is 
paramount to tackling these crimes is what works and not any necessary recourse to 
the courts.‟176 
 
Despite the advantages of civil penalties, to be effective the penalties imposed would 
need to be of significant severity to be effective. Given the low fines imposed, it is 
debatable whether the civil penalties would be significantly greater or used in a more 
robust and effective manner. Civil penalties are also, on the face of it, barely 
distinguishable from criminal fines, blurring the lines between two separate systems 
of law. Civil penalties may also necessitate a more thorough explanation of the 
damage caused, to ensure the penalty reflects this. Embedding civil jurisdiction into 
the enforcement regime of environmental crimes also appears to confirm the widely 
held perception that they are not real crimes, which will go no way to improving 
environmental protection.  
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Directive 2004/35/EC on Environmental Liability177 introduces civil liability to prevent 
and remedy environmental damage178 based on the „“polluter-pays” principle.‟179 The 
emphasis is on remediation and any damages awarded have to be spent on 
environmental restoration.180 However, environmental damage is narrowly defined181 
and liability is only for future harm. The requirement that an operator must take „all 
practical steps‟182 to limit or prevent further harm following environmental damage 
also shows that complete remediation is not required.183 The Directive was meant to 
be transposed into national law by 30th April 2007.184 However, it was not until the 1st 
March 2009, when the Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) 
Regulations 2009185 came into force, that the Directive was transposed into English 
law186 (the delay resulting in a successful enforcement action brought by the 
Commission187). As such the Directive‟s success is not known but the delay suggests 
reluctance towards such measures.  
 
The recently enacted Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 does however 
introduce a new „punishment toolkit‟ enabling regulators to impose a range of civil 
sanctions without using the criminal courts.188 Regulators will be able to levy fines of 
up to £5,000 for minor breaches and will have discretion as to sentence imposed for 
more serious breaches, allowing them to not only punish but to also ensure future 
compliance and restitution of the environment.189 They will also be able to stop 
companies from continuing operations which cause harm, or threaten to cause harm, 
to the environment. Under section 36, powers are conferred on a „Minister of the 
Crown‟ to make orders providing for civil sanctions through the enactment of 
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secondary legislation, and these sanctions include fixed and variable monetary 
penalties, stop notices and enforcement undertakings.190 
 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is also currently 
undertaking consultation into its „proposals for fairer and better environmental 
enforcement.‟191 The Draft Environmental Civil Sanctions Order 2010 seek to achieve 
„more transparent, proportionate, consistent and effective environmental enforcement 
in England and Wales‟192 through civil sanctions and the strengthening of the criminal 
sentencing powers for the worst cases, which would continue to be dealt with through 
the criminal courts. Civil powers are being introduced as a key tool of environmental 
enforcement although as it is unlikely that the full complement of powers will be 
available until 2011, the success of civil penalties in improving environmental 
compliance and protecting the environment remains to be seen.   
 
Conclusion 
The current enforcement of environmental crimes attempts to „shoe-horn‟ 
environmental crime into the constraints and formalities of „traditional‟ criminal 
enforcement, which has resulted in environmental enforcement becoming parasitic 
on a system and structure which is ultimately incompatible.193 Environmental 
offences are looked upon with limited vision,194 failing to consider the reasons for 
non-compliance, the damage caused and the wider impacts, both in terms of global 
effect and future harm.  
 
Harm to the environment is in no sense labelled as a „criminal‟ activity, both by the 
public, who see it as morally acceptable, and the judiciary, who have perpetuated its 
„trivialisation‟195 as something not worth criminal protection. Environmental crimes are 
so „demonstrably unlike‟196 other criminal offences that the current system is not 
flexible or imaginative enough to deal with the vast array of offences that fall under its 
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scope or to understand the effect such offences have197. With problems experienced 
at every stage, the current system is not as effective as it could be in protecting the 
environment and as environmental law continues to develop, even heavier reliance 
will be placed on an already overburdened system198.  
 
Environmental protection for the planet‟s future requires a new level of strong legal 
underpinning coupled with increased public and judicial condemnation. Until 
environmental harm is seen as an activity worthy of legal regulation and punishment, 
no system can properly facilitate the needs of the environment or afford it the 
protection it requires.    
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